The Ethics Of Unwinnable War

According to just war theory, military campaigns should only be fought as a last resort, with the goal of correcting a grave evil, and where there is a high probability of success. But what happens when a military campaign unravels and becomes unwinnable? How can a leader reconcile just war theory with the need to extricate the country from a quagmire? In recent decades, US presidents have repeatedly faced such moral dilemmas, as campaigns in Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq all became unwinnable. When victory is no longer achievable, leaders should dial down the goals of the war, resist the pressure to embrace barbarism, negotiate with the adversary, and seek the best possible peace from the range of plausible alternatives

Pearl Harbor In Reverse: Moral Analogies In The Cuban Missile Crisis

During the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, the argument that U.S. air strikes against Soviet missile sites in Cuba would be morally analogous to the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 had a major impact on policymaking. The invocation of this analogy contributed to President John F. Kennedy\u27s decision to forgo an immediate attack on the missiles and to start instead with a naval blockade of the island. The Pearl Harbor in reverse argument is an example of an important phenomenon that has received little attention in foreign policy analysis—the moral analogy. Fusing together elements of moral and analogical thinking, the moral analogy can be a powerful force in shaping policy preferences, as it was in October 1962

Bad World: The Negativity Bias In International Politics

A major puzzle in international relations is why states privilege negative over positive information. States tend to inflate threats, exhibit loss aversion, and learn more from failures than from successes. Rationalist accounts fail to explain this phenomenon, because systematically overweighting bad over good may in fact undermine state interests. New research in psychology, however, offers an explanation. The “negativity bias” has emerged as a fundamental principle of the human mind, in which people\u27s response to positive and negative information is asymmetric. Negative factors have greater effects than positive factors across a wide range of psychological phenomena, including cognition, motivation, emotion, information processing, decision-making, learning, and memory. Put simply, bad is stronger than good. Scholars have long pointed to the role of positive biases, such as overconfidence, in causing war, but negative biases are actually more pervasive and may represent a core explanation for patterns of conflict. Positive and negative dispositions apply in different contexts. People privilege negative information about the external environment and other actors, but positive information about themselves. The coexistence of biases can increase the potential for conflict. Decisionmakers simultaneously exaggerate the severity of threats and exhibit overconfidence about their capacity to deal with them. Overall, the negativity bias is a potent force in human judgment and decisionmaking, with important implications for international relations theory and practice

The Rubicon Theory of War How the Path to Conflict Reaches the Point of No Return

A major paradox in international relations is the widespread fear and anxiety that underlies the security dilemma in times of peace and the prevalence of overconfidence or false optimism on the eve of war. A new theory of the causes of war—the Rubicon theory of war—can account for this paradox and explain important historical puzzles. The Rubicon model of action phases, which was developed in experimental psychology, describes a significant shift in people\u27s susceptibility to psychological biases before and after making a decision. Prior to making decisions, people tend to maintain a deliberative mind-set, weighing the costs, benefits, and risks of different options in a relatively impartial manner. By contrast, after making a decision, people tend to switch into an implemental mind-set that triggers a set of powerful psychological biases, including closed-mindedness, biased information processing, cognitive dissonance, self-serving evaluations, the illusion of control, and optimism. Together, these biases lead to significant overconfidence. The Rubicon theory of war applies this model to the realm of international conflict, where implemental mind-sets can narrow the range of bargaining options, promote overambitious war plans, and elevate the probability of war

Minimal in vivo efficacy of iminosugars in a lethal Ebola virus guinea pig model

The antiviral properties of iminosugars have been reported previously in vitro and in small animal models against Ebola virus (EBOV); however, their effects have not been tested in larger animal models such as guinea pigs. We tested the iminosugars N-butyl-deoxynojirimycin (NB-DNJ) and N-(9-methoxynonyl)-1deoxynojirimycin (MON-DNJ) for safety in uninfected animals, and for antiviral efficacy in animals infected with a lethal dose of guinea pig adapted EBOV. 1850 mg/kg/day NB-DNJ and 120 mg/kg/day MON-DNJ administered intravenously, three times daily, caused no adverse effects and were well tolerated. A pilot study treating infected animals three times within an 8 hour period was promising with 1 of 4 infected NB-DNJ treated animals surviving and the remaining three showing improved clinical signs. MON-DNJ showed no protective effects when EBOV-infected guinea pigs were treated. On histopathological examination, animals treated with NB-DNJ had reduced lesion severity in liver and spleen. However, a second study, in which NB-DNJ was administered at equally-spaced 8 hour intervals, could not confirm drug-associated benefits. Neither was any antiviral effect of iminosugars detected in an EBOV glycoprotein pseudotyped virus assay. Overall, this study provides evidence that NB-DNJ and MON-DNJ do not protect guinea pigs from a lethal EBOV-infection at the dose levels and regimens tested. However, the one surviving animal and signs of improvements in three animals of the NB-DNJ treated cohort could indicate that NB-DNJ at these levels may have a marginal beneficial effect. Future work could be focused on the development of more potent iminosugars